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Voting Rights in Jeopardy
prospect.org/civil-rights/voting-rights-jeopardy
By Richard Valelly

December 19, 2001

A rumor has been coursing through the Internet and black talk-radio
shows: Congress will disenfranchise black Americans when it reconsiders
the 1965 Voting Rights Act-which it must do by no later than 2007. The
Congressional Black Caucus has fielded hundreds of anxious phone calls
over the past two years; the Justice Department now posts a Web site
rebuttal.
Such rumors illustrate that the "paranoid style" in American politics persists. Yet the Voting
Rights Act is indeed under fire. In its inception, the act was structured to make sure black
Americans could register and vote. But as techniques of resistance in the white South
became more baroque, so did the act, its interpretation, and its remedies. To some critics,
this shift signaled regulatory overreach and racial preference. And in the past decade, the
use of racially conscious legislative districting to increase black representation has further
stimulated political and judicial backlash. Today, political momentum has shifted to critics of
the act, and a major rollback, either legislatively or through the courts, could well occur.
Massive Resistance
Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, barriers to black registration and voting were massive
and crude. The entire white southern way of life was at stake. It was voting rights, more than
anything else, that stimulated the 1964 Freedom Summer, voting rights that split the 1964
Democratic National Convention, and voting rights for which young activists gave their lives.
In 1964, Mississippi had only about 7 percent of its black voting-age population registered to
vote, with a voting-age population that was 36 percent black, Alabama, with a voting-age
population that was 26 percent black, registered less than one eligible black voter in four,
and Louisiana, with a voting-age population that was 28 percent black, registered less than
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one in three. In 1964, out of about 29,000 local, state, and national elected officials in the
entire ex-Confederacy of 11 states, just 16 such officials were black, 3 of these state
legislators and 13 local officials.
The 1965 act focussed entirely on the franchise. The act contained two sets of provisions,
permanent sections that prohibited discrimination in voting, and temporary elements for
enforcement, subject to renewal. The most important of these temporary features was
Section 5 pre-clearance, which empowers the Justice Department to pre-clear any proposed
changes in local registration and voting procedures. But there were also other temporary
sections that barred specific impediments to voting and that provided for direct federal
observation or examination of electoral processes as they occurred. This was the most basic
takeover by Washington of local civic functions since Reconstruction; it was richly deserved
and roundly resented.
No sooner was the law enacted than several southern state legislatures adopted programs of
massive resistance to voting rights, much like the earlier massive resistance to school
desegregation. States recast entire systems of representation in order to dilute black
influence. They permitted or required county and municipal governments to create at-large
voting for public offices, which submerged geographic black voting strength within a larger
white majority. They changed balloting systems so that black voters were forced to vote for
entire tickets, thus blocking any "single-shot" or "bullet-voting" by blacks for a liberal or
minority candidate, which had been permitted previously in some jurisdictions. They pushed
local governments to establish absolute majority vote requirements for winners, thus
preventing plurality victory by a black candidate over a split field of whites. They converted
elective offices to offices appointed by officials likely to have exclusively white support.
Finally, states reapportioned legislative and congressional district lines to submerge black
voting strength in white majorities.
With these changes, blacks could vote-but could achieve neither fair representation nor
elective office. In 1969, however, the Supreme Court rejected such vote dilution in Allen v.
State Board of Elections. Mississippi officials had defended a 1966 maneuver converting the
district election of county supervisors to an at-large election, as was permissible under the
Voting Rights Act. Since the act ostensibly covered only registration requirements,
Mississippi's change had not required clearance from the Justice Department.
The Supreme Court, however, grasped the essential politics of the matter. If blacks could not
elect county supervisors, the old local white power structure would survive intact. Traditional
white elites would continue to levy county taxes and spend county money as before,
directing construction and maintenance money to white contractors and white
neighborhoods, appointing all-white welfare and planning boards without concern for minority
interests, and drawing up white jury lists for the state courts.
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The Court ruled that such devices did in fact require clearance. It held that the right to vote
can be affected by a "dilution of voting power as well as by obstacles to casting a ballot.
Voters who are members of a racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but
in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could therefore nullify
their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them from
voting."
With Allen, the burden of proof shifted to affected states and localities to show that proposed
changes in electoral systems, as well as voting procedures, were not discriminatory. Allen
thus made it possible for the Justice Department to efficiently monitor the evolution of state
and local electoral structures. The Justice Department's Civil Rights Division has scrutinized
about 200,000 proposed changes to electoral rules since Allen and objected to about 1
percent of them.
In a subsequent 1973 decision from Texas, White v. Regester, the Court further held such
vote dilution unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment. Armed with White, the private
voting rights bar was able to overthrow many at-large structures and gerrymanders that
predated the Voting Rights Act, in some cases by half a century. Litigation also challenged
vote dilution in places not explicitly covered by Section 5, including southwestern jurisdictions
where Anglo politicians had long rigged systems of representation to short-circuit Latino
political influence.
The Allen and White rulings and the concept of "dilution of voting power" were in effect
codified in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Congress said that while nothing
in the act "establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population," it also provided that there is a "denial or abridgement of
the right to vote" if electoral processes are not "equally open to participation" by "members of
a protected class" and if such members "have less opportunity . . . to elect representatives of
their choice."
The Backlash
The entire anti-vote dilution movement of the past three decades, and the provisions of the
Voting Rights Act supporting it, are now lightning rods for controversy. Critics such as Abigail
Thernstrom see the anti-vote dilution approach as regulatory excess. She and kindred critics
make three basic points. First, even in the Deep South, politics have sufficiently normalized
to the point where heroic federal supervision of local affairs is no longer necessary. Second,
anti-dilution measures, especially "racial gerrymandering," have gone too far and now
amount to unconstitutional favoritism which violates the 14th Amendment. Third, liberal
critics such as the political scientist Carol Swain argue that the herding of black voters into
districts of their own has "bleached" surrounding districts, paradoxically leading to the overall
election of more conservatives unfriendly to black interests.
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Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court itself has increasingly undermined the anti-vote
dilution doctrine and program without explicitly reversing its earlier decisions. The Court has
applied some of its long-held unease about affirmative action to the voting rights domain. A
majority of the Court now holds that the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
casts grave doubt on whether government efforts to aid minorities are any more defensible
than government efforts to favor whites; ideally, government should be "color-blind." Four
justices, Anthony Kennedy, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas,
believe that all race-conscious policies-including voting rights policies-run some risk of being
invidious. Racial classifications should therefore be subject to "strict" judicial scrutiny, and
upheld only if there is a compelling interest in support of the classification. Otherwise, the
policy denies equal protection of the laws.
Only the ambivalence of one justice has kept the Court from a major retreat on vote dilution.
In key recent decisions, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has sent mixed signals, leaving 30
years of anti-vote dilution law and politics under a cloud of constitutional suspicion. But there
will likely be far less sympathy for the vote-dilution doctrine by the time the temporary
provisions of the Voting Rights Act come up for statutory renewal in 2007.
Helms's Integrity
If the Supreme Court and/or Congress do substantially weaken the act, what then? The
answer depends on how rational politicians with little attachment to minority interests will
respond to a looser regulatory environment. Here the paradigmatic story is Jesse Helms's
1990 senatorial re-election campaign.
Recall that George Bush won the presidency in 1988 partly by savaging Willie Horton. His
chief electoral strategist, the late Lee Atwater, used racial polarization to build the Republican
Party. This was the national backdrop to events in North Carolina in the fall of 1990.
The Helms for Senate Committee and the North Carolina Republican Party arranged for
125,000 postcards to be mailed to black-majority voting precincts. The cards falsely stated
that people who had recently changed residence would not be allowed to vote under North
Carolina law, would be required to prove residence on election day, and risked federal
criminal penalties of up to five years in jail if they gave false information. Two separate
targeted mailings occurred after official voter registration figures showed that the percentage
increase in African-American registration in the run-up to the election was twice that of white
voters (10.6 percent, as opposed to 5.3 percent for whites). Polls also showed that Helms's
African-American opponent, Democrat Harvey Gantt, was ahead eight points.
When thousands of postcards came back as undeliverable, the North Carolina Republican
Party then began to draw up lists of voters who would be challenged on election day itself.
The Justice Department swung against this last effort, and the Helms campaign dropped it.
In early 1992, the various defendants and the Justice Department signed a consent decree
enjoining such ballot security programs. (Helms evidently misjudged the Bush administration.
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Its assistant attorney general for civil rights refused to tolerate Helms's "ballot integrity"
program.) Whether a future Justice Department could move against a future ballot integrity
strategy depends on how seriously Congress and the courts weaken the Voting Rights Act.
Rights in Jeopardy
The Voting Rights Act, as applied, has been in trouble with the Supreme Court since the
Shaw v. Reno decision of 1993, in which the Court limited racial gerrymandering. The Court
ruled that white plaintiffs in the Twelfth Congressional District of North Carolina were entitled
to a full lower court trial to determine whether the North Carolina state legislature had
created a majority-black congressional district so gerrymandered that it violated the equal
protection clause. Then, in a 1995 Georgia case, Miller v. Johnson, the Court stated that race
cannot be a "predominant factor" in congressional districting. But a year later, in a Texas
case, Bush v. Vera, the Court's vital "fifth vote," Justice O'Connor, defected from the coalition
she had built in Shaw. In her opinion for the Court, O'Connor explicitly stated that the states
could not reasonably avoid taking race into account when they drew congressional districts.
Indeed, strict scrutiny did "not apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority
districts."
Nonetheless, if a Republican takes the oath of presidential office in January 2001, the
balance on the Court will likely shift to the "color-blind" camp. During the next presidency,
Justice John Paul Stevens will almost certainly retire. A larger majority might well openly
conclude that anti-vote dilution policy is always subject to strict scrutiny. That would
effectively nullify Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which holds that there is a "denial or
abridgement of the right to vote" if electoral processes are not "equally open to participation"
by "members of a protected class" and if such members "have less opportunity . . . to elect
representatives of their choice."
For the second time in American history, the federal government might largely withdraw from
enforcing black voting rights. This last happened in the mid-1890s, when the Democratic
Party used the occasion of unified government during Grover Cleveland's second
administration to repeal the federal election laws established during Reconstruction to
enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments. In that vacuum of federal protection, black
disenfranchisement accelerated between 1890 and 1910, as state constitutions were
amended and legislatures instituted highly effective literacy tests and poll taxes. The great
democratic experiment of Reconstruction expired. Shortly after, Congress and President
Woodrow Wilson approved a thorough segregation of the federal workforce and of the
government washrooms and lunchrooms in the District of Columbia. Symbolically, the federal
government was now for whites only.
Of course, unlike in the 1890s, intense racism in electoral politics is now defunct. Both
parties now compete for the votes of blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. Further, even
if racism persists, African Americans have political resources to take care of themselves-due
in part to the Voting Rights Act itself. One of the architects of the act, Nicholas Katzenbach,
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emphasized this point in a recent interview (even as he characterized Shaw and Miller as
"nutty decisions"). Every southern legislature has experienced black office holders. Many
white politicians have large numbers of black constituents. The playing field in race relations
may well be level enough to compensate for federal departure from electoral regulation.
Or is it? As an aphorism attributed to Mark Twain has it, "History may not repeat itself but it
sure can rhyme." Here is how history might rhyme.
How History Might Rhyme (I)
First, minority voters might suddenly find the act of voting a bit more chilling. If Congress
declines to renew the act's pre-clearance mechanism, then local governments could resort to
a variety of tempting tactics. For instance, they would be free to relocate the polls to
predominantly white schools in neighborhoods known for, say, aggressive policing. Such
ploys occurred in the 1970s; are we sure they would not happen again?
Expiration of the act's special provisions would also end the federal observer and examiner
mechanism. Crude, Jesse Helms-style "ballot integrity" programs could well produce lawsuits
under the weaker 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. But even armed with the full statutory
authority of the 1965 act as strengthened in 1975 and 1982, the feds did not smoothly swing
into action against Helms's 1990 ballot security campaign. A former attorney at the Justice
Department told me recently that it was a "Herculean task" to assemble a bureaucratic
coalition for intervention. Most ballot integrity programs are more subtle, like the radio ads in
a local Texas contest in the early 1990s that sought to confuse elderly black voters about
whether their absentee voting was legal. Or they resemble New York City Mayor Rudy
Giuliani's campaign against his predecessor, David Dinkins, in which city police officers
placed posters in Hispanic neighborhoods announcing that noncitizens who voted would be
subject to penalties by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
With a weaker statute, most such maneuvers would fly below the Justice Department's radar,
but still dissuade minority voting. The temptation is enormous, in a close election, to try some
funny stuff to keep some minority voters away from the polls, particularly if the candidate has
already written off minority support.
How History Might Rhyme (II)
There's a second way history could rhyme. Local governments with narrow white electoral
majorities could return to at-large elections for city or county government. Or they could
annex white suburbs or make other kinds of changes that produce vote dilution. But without
Section 5 pre-clearance, the burden of proving discriminatory intent would shift to minority
plaintiffs. Some changes might actually be immune from challenge at all. Earlier in this
decade, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that judicial elections were immune from
vote dilution claims if a state argued that it had a compelling interest in having such elections
be at-large. Obviously this could be a slippery slope toward more at-large elections.
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A critical factor here is the increased conservatism of the southern federal courts and of their
appellate circuits. In this decade, judges appointed by Reagan and Bush have shown a
willingness to increase the burdens of proof on minority plaintiffs. Vote dilution cases often
rest on a demonstration of what is known as "racially polarized voting," that is, a history of
cohesive bloc voting by white voters in the majority such that no ordinary black politician can
ever hope to crack it. In 1986, in Thornburgh v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that
remedies to vote dilution could be implemented under the Voting Rights Act if there was
strong evidence that this factor of racially polarized voting consistently blocked minority
electoral success. Yet in the mid-1990s, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, absurdly,
that proof of racially polarized voting must show that such voting is found both in elections
with a minority candidate and in elections with no minority candidate. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that proof of racially polarized voting requires disentangling racial
animus among white voters from their party identification and showing it to be the primary
factor in racially polarized voting-a fairly extraordinary intent standard.
In other words, a return to old-fashioned vote dilution could occur simply through shifting the
odd, costly burdens of proof to minority plaintiffs. In a more permissive environment of a
weaker act, the entire landscape of voting would be different. And all of this would be
occurring in the context of dramatically altered public opinion.
In 1987-one year after a decision in which a friendlier Supreme Court explained how voting
rights plaintiffs could implement the new, amended Section 2, the political scientist Abigail
Thernstrom published an influential attack on the anti-vote dilution program. In Whose Votes
Count?, she spelled out what she considered regulatory excess. Since her book appeared,
several critical propositions about the Voting Rights Act have gained a wide audience.
First, as noted, the regulatory excess critique of the Voting Rights Act holds that special
provisions for minority office-holding were unnecessary; black politicians would have done
fine on their own. Critics such as Thernstrom concede that whites, especially in the South,
seldom vote for black candidates. But for Thernstrom et al, black candidates do not lose
among white voters because of racial animus, but because they are too liberal for most
whites. These outcomes are policy quarrels, largely devoid of invidious racial meaning.
Yet in jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act, the increases in black and minority
office-holding in local and state legislatures and in Congress have depended on federal
intervention. Two landmark studies, Quiet Revolution in the South, edited by Bernard
Grofman and Chandler Davidson (1994), and J. Morgan Kousser's Colorblind Injustice
(1999), have shown this unambiguously. Thernstrom's idea that minorities, absent federal
intervention, would have gained office at anything like the same rate is pure fancy.
As Thomas Pettigrew, the sociologist, has put it in an oft-quoted passage, "If a black is
running against a white, you look at survey data and you take the white 'don't know' vote and
simply add it to the white candidate's total. Ten times out of ten that comes within a couple of
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percentage points of what happens." Verifying this estimate in an ingenious clinical
experiment described in his recent book, Voting Hopes or Fears?, my colleague Keith
Reeves empirically confirmed Pettigrew's educated guess.
So blacks do have some trouble gaining white support, and not just because there are policy
disagreements. Again, this suggests that without the anti-vote dilution program of the past 30
years, there would be far fewer minorities in public office today.
Of course, there is more to the debate over the anti-vote dilution program. Many have noted
a subtle problem with using the Voting Rights Act to get minorities into state legislatures and
Congress: it seems to weaken the southern Democratic Party, as Carol Swain first pointed
out some years ago. In order to have more minorities serving in the House, and thus to meet
the requirements of the amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Democratic state
legislatures armed with new, sophisticated software created ultra-gerrymandered districts in
covered states. They did this in order to maximize black ability to elect black representatives,
while doing minimal partisan damage to adjacent districts. Swain concluded, with some
overstatement, that this process drained surrounding districts of minority voters.
Implementing the Voting Rights Act "bleached" these districts, in other words. As Justice
Scalia asked in 1995 during oral argument in a voting rights case, "Aren't the black
community's interests better served if black voters are spread among many districts rather
than concentrated in a few?"
In fact, the white South was well on the way to going heavily Republican with or without the
creation of majority-minority seats. At most, the concentration of minority votes tipped a few
additional seats into the Republican column. In addition, David Lublin, an American
University political scientist, has performed a statistical analysis indicating that substantive
representation of black interests "kicks in" when a district's voting-age population is around
40 percent black. In other words, "influence" districts of about 40 percent would have been
good enough for black representation and even black office-holding, with less "bleaching" of
surrounding districts. This finding should strengthen both the intellectual, political, and
constitutional case for retaining race-sensitive districting.
Nonetheless, it remains the case that strong measures against vote dilution, including the
deliberate creation of districts where blacks had a reasonable shot at winning election, were
necessary to get minority politicians off to a running start. The representative from a
congressional district which has a minority voting-age population below about 40 percent
turns out to be more or less blind and deaf to minority policy interests.
It is certainly encouraging that minority office holders have been able to build multiracial
coalitions, and to survive redistricting that deprived them of majority-minority districts. But
this is entirely the fruit of the Voting Rights Act and the racially conscious districting that
allowed them to attain office in the first place. We aren't going to get such politicians,
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however, without majority-minority districting in some form. Without it, there is less chance
that we will see minorities at the legislative table, and out and about, working their districts,
building multiracial cooperation.
In sum, the "regulatory excess" view of federal voting rights policies is a gross exaggeration.
The "bleaching" argument is empirically much sounder, but it has been rather overblown.
Majority-minority districting of congressional, state, and local districts builds social solidarity.
It has, indeed, helped white voters in many congressional districts to trust minority office
holders. There are alternatives to it, such as cumulative voting and proportional
representation, and in principle they are attractive. But if campaign finance reform, a major
issue, cannot make progress, it strains credulity to think that we will ever see a full-scale shift
to electoral structures that voters would regard as genuinely foreign.
Back to Which Future?
Emerging trust in minority office-holding gets to the bottom-line issue: What kind of political
future do we want? One future we might go back to is something like the gradual diminution
of minority office-holding that happened in the 1880s and 1890s. The other future toward
which we can go back is the rich experiment in representation and office-holding which this
country pioneered during Reconstruction.
From 1867 to 1877 about 2000 blacks served as federal, state, and local office holders in the
ex-Confederate states subject to congressional Reconstruction. They were almost all
strongly Republican in their policy views, and concentrated in the Deep South states with
majority black or significantly black populations: South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia, in that order. Between 1868 and 1876 an average of 268
black men served during the legislative sessions of the state legislatures in 10 southern
states.
The standard picture of Reconstruction, of course, is that it was a time of corruption and
incompetence. In fact, minority office-holding meant good government-it meant public
education systems that the South never had, America's first civil rights laws, and fair criminal
justice as blacks sat on juries for the first time. In South Carolina there was a very brief
period of decently administered, state-sponsored homesteading and land reform for black
families. In the city of New Orleans minority office-holding meant the first genuinely
integrated school system in America (and, unhappily, the last such system for a century). In
several states, the legislatures also supported nascent trade unions and labor movements of,
for instance, stevedores and rice pickers.
As it happens, we do not face an all-or-nothing decision of the kind imagined in rumors of
disenfranchisement. A reversal of voting rights gains would be gradual and incremental. But
rather than passively waiting to see what comes, we ought to positively renew our national
commitment to the practices that once made America a pioneer in democratic possibility. We
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should keep working toward giving the 15th Amendment all of the meaning its framers
wanted for it. With the civil rights laws of the 1960s we redeemed the Civil War amendments
of the 1860s. But there is still work to do to make history rhyme the right way.
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